Introduction
This chapter aims at a better understanding of the complexities of the interaction between the temporal and modal meanings in French by means of a model inspired by Reichenbach's (1947) classical apparatus but in which the coordinates are replaced by intervals (among other amendments). Such a replacement, we suggest, bears a number of theoretical consequences that allow a model to encompass a large scope of phenomena dealing with time, modality, and their interaction within a single framework. French shows a particularly complex variety of items where the complex interaction of time and modality have long been problematic for the grammatical tradition. In the argument developed in this chapter, we evoke the notions referred to by French linguists when tackling these objects of study, observing that the literature in the field too often struggles to resolve the semantics of temporal and aspectual markers with the classical but inaccurate assumption that temporal and modal expressions form separate categories. To the contrary, this chapter envisages a very different approach, in which each eventuality referred to in an utterance is not only situated in time and presented with an aspectual viewpoint, but also conveys a semantic modality that specifies that the eventuality is conceived of either as a fact or as a mere possibility. We argue that the modality is derived from the aspectual viewpoint on the basis of the modal asymmetry of linguistic time; that is, that what precedes the point of reference is irrevocable, and belongs to historical necessity, whereas what is posterior to the reference point is represented as merely possible. In this framework, this assumption leads to a set of predictions concerning the modal meaning of tenses and of the so-called 'aspectual periphrases' which are used in French to express phasal aspect (see Dik 1989) .
In Section 5.2, we argue against the classical conception of relations between time and modality, in particular, in the French tradition. We show that, to the contrary, temporal and modal expressions cannot be considered as strictly separate. Then we present the hypothesis of the modal asymmetry of linguistic time (Section 5.3), and our model using intervals (Section 5.4). The integration of the hypothesis of modal asymmetry of time within this model leads to a new analysis of modal values of aspectual viewpoints, and consequently of tenses (Sections 5.5 and 5.6). Finally, we extend this analysis to a number of 'aspectual periphrases' (Sections 5.7-5.9).
General preliminaries
The French literature usually regards time and modality as strictly distinct, 2 that is, it considers that what is temporal cannot be modal and vice versa. The idea stems from the grammatical tradition that reasons in terms of 'modes', that is, semantic modalities associated with paradigms of tenses. In this line of thought, all 'modes' but the indicative have exclusively non-temporal, modal values, whereas the indicative may have, depending on the context, either (non-modal) temporal values or (nontemporal) modal values, as summarized in Figure 5 .1. A particularly interesting case in this respect is the traditional analysis of the French imperfective past (imparfait, henceforth IMP). This tense is traditionally seen as bearing a temporal meaning in most cases, as in (1a), but also a modal one, indicating irrealis, in a number of specific cases, including if-clauses but not restricted to them; see the examples in (1b-c): If I win-IMP ('won') the lottery, I would buy a car. c. Sans son intervention, je me trompais de chemin. 6 Without his intervention, I make-IMP a mistake about the way to follow 'Without his help, I would have gone the wrong way.' By comparison, it is assumed that the French simple past (henceforth SP) always has a temporal value (inscribing the eventuality, so to speak, in the realm of the real), 7 though a more detailed analysis shows that there are in fact usages where the simple past expresses only a possibility, as (2) demonstrates:
(2) Quant à Fausta, si cette révélation l'émut, si le visage bouleversé de ce père lui inspira autre chose que de la curiosité, on n'eût pu le savoir. (M. Zévaco, La Fausta)
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As to Fausta, if this revelation move-SP her, if the anguished face of this father inspire-SP her anything other than curiosity, one could not know it. 'As to Fausta, there was no way of knowing if this revelation moved her, if the anguished face of this father inspired anything other than curiosity.'
This alleged dichotomy rests on questionable assumptions, notably that we hold as temporal that which is certain, proven, known, asserted, but as modal that which is uncertain, potential, considered, unasserted. It is striking to note that such assumptions are actually incompatible with the definitions of time and modality that are adopted even within those studies which posit them. Indeed, the classical view is that tense is about localization within a time period, determined in relation to the speech point ('absolute time') or to a point of reference ('relative time'). Modality is itself a concept that is variously understood from trend to trend, but it is usually conceived of as the linguistic marking of the speaker's attitude vis-à-vis the represented content. If we 5 On these usages, see Martin (1991); Gosselin (1999); Bres (2005); Patard (2007) . 6 On these usages, see Kleiber and Berthonneau (2003) ; Berthonneau and Kleiber (2006); Bres (2006) . 7 See, among others, Touratier (1996: 101-2); Caudal, Roussarie, and Vetters (2003: 63) . 8 See Brunot (1922: 887-8 adhere to these definitions, the eventualities expressed in examples (1b-c) and (2) bear not only a temporal meaning but at the same time also a modal one. They are indeed situated on the timeline with regard to the speech point as anterior (past, examples (1a and 1c)), simultaneous (present), or posterior (future, example (1b)), but they are obviously entertained as possible or otherwise unreal, thus bearing a modal meaning. Two options are then on offer: either we alter the definitions of 'temporality' and 'modality', which does not seem very sound, or we reject the classical 'dichotomy' assumption in favour of a more elaborated account of the interaction of temporal and modal meanings as empirically observed. This, we suggest, amounts to considering time, aspect, and modality as essential components of all utterances, each in its own way, although not implying that their various meanings could not be selected in various circumstances according to pertinent schemes of interpretation.
9 If this perspective is correct, then all eventualities, be it a state, an activity or an event, are situated in time-more or less precisely-but also presented under a certain aspect and according to a specific type of modality. Modality, in turn, should not be understood in the rather fuzzy way in which it is understood in the grammatical tradition, but rather as encompassing all possible ways the speaker positions herself vis-à-vis the propositional content, that is, including presenting the eventuality as merely true (what Kant calls 'assertoric modality').
10
Furthermore, concerning these various levels of meaning, we observe the following:
(a) they are not necessarily marked by morphemes specifically dedicated to expressing them, but generally result from the interaction between several markers (lexical or grammatical morphemes and constructions); (b) they have a reciprocal influence upon each other. This is illustrated in Figure 5 .2.
9 This entails in turn a conception where types of meanings are discriminated into, for example, 'standard' versus 'derived' meanings (or 'values'), as in Gosselin (1996) This asymmetrical structure accounts for the fact that time presents itself as an irreversible flux, which continuously converts the possible into the irrevocable; this conversion occurs at a specific modal breakpoint involving a modal change. We represent this structure in Figure 5 .3: 14 or, according to branching time theory, in Figure 5 .4:
This modal structure has received various interpretations. In possible-worlds semantics, the general assumption is that it is of a metaphysical nature, 15 that is, it expresses the objective structure of reality. However, this metaphysical conception is, contrary to what is sometimes claimed, far from obvious. It corresponds in fact to a vision of the structure of reality, both occidental and relatively recent, for which there is no omniscient God, no prophets, no divination, no destiny or determinism. According to another interpretation, this asymmetrical structure is that of subjective 11 I have analysed the interaction of temporal and aspectual markers in Gosselin (1996) , of modal markers in Gosselin (2010a) , and the interaction of time, aspect, and modality in Gosselin (2005 Gosselin ( , 2010a .
12 See von Wright (1984); Vuillemin (1984) . 13 See Thomason (1984 time, and the modalities in question thus take on an epistemic value. For Culioli (1978) and Desclés (1994: 61) , the modal breakpoint separates the certain (the past and present) from the uncertain (the future). In a more complex model, 16 Langacker (1991) opposes known reality, present or past (defined as that which the speaker accepts as constituting reality), to irreality, which encompasses part of the present and past and the totality of the future. According to this perspective, we cannot entertain any certainties about the future, while the past and the present, so long as they are known, correspond to certainty. This division can also be correlated with the subject's cognitive abilities. According to Chafe (1995) , an individual accesses the present via perception, the past via memory, and the future via imagination-and imagination seems incompatible with certainty. But this analysis does not seem adequate, since in real life we do in fact feel certain of many things about the future-especially the immediate future. We can even say that many voluntary movements of our bodies are guided by such a certainty. And, on the other hand, we do also feel a great deal of uncertainty about the past 17 -especially the remote past-even if we have knowledge of it (so long as we've heard about it), and it seems that we access it just as much by the imagination as we do by memory. In fact, the modal asymmetry of time is considered obvious only from the perspective of practical philosophy, from the point of view of deliberation and action. The argument is a classical one (see Plato, Protagoras 324b; Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea VI, 2, 1139b 6-11; Alexander of Aphrodisias, De Fato, 11-12): one cannot modify the past, one can only deliberate and act upon the future. In this respect, the modal difference is clear-cut and certainly unquestionable. In so far as this structure fundamentally concerns action, we will henceforth call this the pragmatic time. The modal asymmetry of pragmatic time is the fundamental condition for the possibility of free action (whether physical or verbal), and thus for all that presupposes acting freely: deliberation, rhetoric, ethics, and so forth. Even the recourse to Theory of Mind presupposes the modal asymmetry of pragmatic time: speech acts as well as mental states are themselves oriented towards the irrevocable, and thus towards the present or the past (e.g. admonition, repentance, or nostalgia), or towards the possible and thus the future (e.g. suggestions and all directive acts, hope, or fear). Argumentation itself entails the possibility of acting upon the beliefs of an audience, insofar as even a philosophy that would refuse to give any kind of credit to the obvious fact of modal asymmetry would nonetheless need to concede that-from a pragmatic angle-the future is open. Otherwise, a 'performative contradiction' would undermine it.
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16 For a critical discussion, see Gosselin (2005: 79-82) . 17 See Jaszczolt (2009: 50) . On the past-future asymmetry, see also Jaszczolt, this volume. 18 See Apel (1986) .
In this perspective, it is the present moment (being the time of the decision about a projected action) that brings about the modal change between the possible and the irrevocable. The present moment thus introduces a modal breakpoint.
The issue then is to assess whether and how much this asymmetrical structure of pragmatic time affects linguistic time. Since temporal semantics concerns the way utterances represent eventualities and not what we think we know of the world we live in, we must first point out that linguistic time mirrors neither pragmatic time, nor metaphysical time, nor a 'subjective' notion of time. Language does allow a speaker to evoke past possibilities (i.e. not only facts) and to present future events otherwise than as merely undetermined, or even as inevitable, even when they are not naturally plausible, as in the following 'prophetic' usage of the future: Immediately after the despair of those days, the sun darken-FUT, the moon lose-FUT its shining, the stars fall-FUT from heaven . . . 'Immediately after the tribulation of those days shall the sun be darkened, and the moon shall not give her light, and the stars shall fall from heaven . . . ' (Holy Bible, King James Version)
Some have been able to use the asymmetrical structure to give an account of temporal semantics with some success. 20 Yet this is because such proposals posit a modal asymmetry comparable to that of pragmatic time, with a difference regarding the moment taken to create the modal breakpoint. Vet (1981) , for example, interfaces Reichenbach's model with possible-worlds semantics and takes the reference point R as the key moment, explaining: "The course of events, which is real up to R, can take various paths after R" (pp. 112-13). At the level of semantic time, it is thus R which is assumed as creating the modal breakpoint. We draw upon this assumption within our own framework, the Interval-semantic model of time (Gosselin 1996 (Gosselin , 2005 , which in turn leads to further predictions.
The Interval-semantic model
ISM-for Interval-semantic model-is a Reichenbach-inspired model which was initially designed with the aim of accounting for the semantics of tenses in French; 21 its raison d'être comes basically from the identification of two major shortcomings of the original framework by Reichenbach which (i) is too simplistic as regards representations of the temporality of eventualities and (ii) suffers from inaccurate computational principles. Unsurprisingly, then, the ISM model presents two fundamental innovations that concern precisely representational format on the one hand and computational principles on the other. As regards representation, Reichenbach's coordinates are replaced by intervals, which increases the number of potential relations. The ISM model implements four types of interval positioned along the temporal axis: In this framework, absolute time can be defined by the relation between [I,II] and [01, 02] . 23 We can distinguish three types of absolute time: 26 English normally forbids combining a present perfect with a temporal adverb (a problem known as the 'present perfect puzzle'); see Klein (1992) . Our English translation does not render the perfect meaning of (6), and the temporal adverb does not correspond accurately to the French depuis; the schema for (6), thus, is not accurate for English while being accurate for French, in the resultative meaning of the composed past.
B1
I II B2 These interval structures are computed from instructions coded by various items in the utterance in interaction with temporal-aspectual compositional rules and with background information (encyclopaedic and situational). Technically, a temporalaspectual structure results from a network of constraints that apply to interval variables-a process which the above schemata only sketch for the sake of clarity.
When several eventualities are in relation with each other (for example in a text), computational rules determine the relations that are set up between intervals. We represent such relations, still for the sake of clarity, by duplicating the temporal axis. For instance, when an eventuality with imperfective aspectual viewpoint provides the background for a foreground perfective one, as in example (11) and Figure 5 .12, we take the latter's interval (interval of the eventuality) to be established as identical with the interval of reference associated with the former. We account for the (at least apparent) contextual polysemy of temporal and aspectual markers by a notion of conflict resolution: the instructions encoded by 28 For more on background relations and the imperfective aspect, see Weinrich (1973); Reinhart (1986) ; Kamp and Rohrer (1983) ; Asher and Bras (1993 the items may occasionally conflict, either with one another, or with direct compositional rules. These conflicts prompt the regular and predictable conflict-resolution mechanisms, which, we suggest, have to do with a higher level of compositionality. A typical case in point is the combination of items deprived of frequentative meaning that nevertheless lead to an frequentative interpretation. This occurs in example (12), displaying a famous sentence by Proust (the beginning of his Remembrance of Things Past):
(12) Longtemps, je me suis couché de bonne heure. For a long time, I go-CP to bed early. 'For a long time, I used to go to bed early.'
The frequentative interpretation of (12) (made explicit in the English translation with used to) arises despite the fact that no frequentative meaning is associated with the linguistic items themselves. We suggest that the frequentative interpretation precisely obtains through a conflict-resolution mechanism. In fact, neither the French passé composé (roughly a present perfect) nor the verb phrase (se coucher de bonne heure) bear frequentative meanings. The reading of (13), without the duration adverb longtemps ('for a long time'), leaves no doubt that the interpretation is not frequentative but singulative; thus iteration has to do with the insertion of longtemps.
(13) Je me suis couché de bonne heure.
I go-PP to bed early. 'I went to bed early.' However, it has to be noted that the adverb longtemps it is not a frequentative marker either, as the singulative meaning of (14) illustrates: (14) Longtemps, je t'ai cru mort, perdu! Assassiné! (Villiers de l'Isle-Adam, Le Prétendant IV, 5) 'For a long time, I thought you were dead, lost! Assassinated!'
At this point, two options are available. Either (i) we postulate the presence of an 'invisible' (Vlach 1981: 71) or 'silent ' (van Geenhoven 2004 ' (van Geenhoven , 2005 frequentative operator within these structures that is endowed with a semantic content yet deprived of a morphological and phonetic realization, or (ii) we consider iteration to be a value that emerges from the interaction between various constitutive markers in the utterance. The first solution is obviously unfalsifiable, if not circular. The second type of analysis (adopted by, among others, Vet 1981, Kleiber 1987, and Moens and Steedman 1988) considers iteration to be a means of resolving the conflict between discordant elements. In this example, it is the conflict between the duration adverb longtemps and the isolated eventuality that is resolved by the construction of an iterative series: the adverb no longer scopes over the eventuality, but, instead, over the series of eventualities. In such cases, we assume, compositionality is not 'direct' 
Modal values of aspectual viewpoints
Rephrased in the framework of the ISM model, Vet's hypothesis (Vet 1981) about the modal asymmetry of time (saying that the modal change occurs at R) takes the following form: in the indicative, it is the final bound of the reference interval (II) which brings about the modal break between the irrevocable and the possible. A simple test is associated with this hypothesis: if the right-bound context may indicate that the eventuality did not occur (or wasn't completed), then the eventuality belongs entirely (or partially if it wasn't completed) to the realm of the mere possible.
With regard to the types of aspectual viewpoints identified above, this leads to the following predictions, which relate to what we shall henceforth call 'aspectual modal values': (a) With perfective (il traversa la route 'he cross-SP the road') and perfect (il a traversé la route depuis 5 minutes 'he cross-CP the road five minutes ago') viewpoints, the eventualities are entirely situated within the irrevocable, as in With atelic eventualities, the same configuration simply leads to considering as possible only the fact that the imperfective eventuality, taken as a background, may continue after the completion of the foreground eventuality. For example, with Les élèves parlaient quand le proviseur entra 'the students were talking when the principal entered the room', whether the students continued to talk remains unknown in the absence of further indication, as is represented in Figure 5 .16.
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(c) The prospective viewpoint leaves the entire eventuality within the realm of the possible (il allait traverser la route (quand soudain . . . ) 'he was going to cross the road (when suddenly . . . )'), as in Figure 5 .17.
Relations between temporal modal values and aspectual modal values
We posited earlier that semantic time is relatively independent of pragmatic time. However, we suggest that specific meanings arise in the confrontation of these two temporalities, which are both asymmetrical but for which the modal breakpoint occurs at different times. We shall speak of 'temporal modal values' when the representation is built upon the speech time (02), corresponding to B1 I II B2 (a) First, the speaker presents a future eventuality as determinate at the semantic level, that is, pertaining to the possible at the pragmatic level. (b) Second, the speaker presents a past eventuality, pertaining to the irrevocable at the pragmatic level, as indeterminate (either partially or totally).
The first case typically corresponds to the simple future, as in (15) and (16), and Figure 5 .18:
(15) La cavalerie attaquera à l'aube (Fauconnier 1979: 13) 'The cavalry will attack at dawn.' will take on an injunctive or predictive illocutionary force. Likewise, in example (16), the future alternatively marks the speaker's commitment to act (je les préviendrai 'I will tell them; je vous avertirai 'I will warn you'), belief (tout espoir sera perdu 'when all hope . . . is lost'), and an order (vous m'avertirez 'You will warn me'). The case of the 'prophetic' meaning with the future tense (cf. example (3) above) is different, in so far as the prophet and those who consider him such admit that the future is (pre)determined and non-modifiable, so that there is a convergence, not a divergence, between pragmatic time and semantic time.
The second case, which consists in presenting past events (thus temporally irrevocable) as (partially or totally) possible, is typical of narrative texts. It illustrates the capacity of the language to represent (that is, rendering as present, to simulate presence) 32 past eventualities, by attributing a characteristic of the present-bringing about the modal breakpoint in pragmatic time-to a past moment (the Reference point). This device is particularly used in popular fiction to create suspense, as in (17) While reading, the reader can thus feel mental states that are normally oriented towards the future, such as expectation, hope, or fear, despite them being about past events. We will now confront these general principles in more complex structures in which certain eventuality-phases are selected. But it is necessary to explain beforehand how this selection of phases functions in French. The same holds of punctual eventualities, since even if it is true that a punctual eventuality does not allow for the observation of its internal aspect, all forms of dilation of these eventualities demonstrate their virtual decomposition into three internal phases. 34 See Moens and Steedman (1988); Kamp and Reyle (1993: 558ff.) ; Gosselin (1996: 50ff.); or Croft (2011). This aspectual phasal structure varies with each aspectual category. 35 Mereotopology deals with the disposition of the parts within a whole (see Casati and Varzi 1999). 36 Victor Hugo especially favours such grossisements fantastiques 'fantastic zooms' (see Gosselin 1996: 68-9 for a full page example we cannot reproduce here). semi-auxiliary 37 followed by an infinitive verb or a participle). 38 Yet these aspectual periphrases do not form a homogeneous class (François 1993 (François , 2003 . Gosselin (2010b Gosselin ( , 2010c Gosselin ( , 2011 posits that two classes of French aspectual periphrases must be distinguished for their syntactic and semantic behaviour, as specified in what follows. It is widely acknowledged that the general category of aspect subsumes two distinct operations: a categorization operation that constructs entities in time ('conceptual aspect') and a operation of 'monstration' ('aspectual viewpoint') which makes visible all or part of the entities constructed beforehand by the categorization. 39 The categorization constructs eventualities-noted [B1,B2]-while 'monstration' determines an aspectual viewpoint, defined by the position of the Reference interval's [I,II], relative to that of the eventuality. We hypothesize that periphrases of the first type select eventuality-phases through categorization; that is they extract subparts of eventualities as referents and involve semi-auxiliaries which we label 'V-MAP', bearing meanings of motion, 40 mode of action, 41 and phase, such as cesser de (roughly 'stop to'), s'apprêter à (roughly 'getting ready to'), partir ('leave'), or rentrer de X (roughly 'getting back from X'). A second type of periphrase, which we label 'aux-AV', introduces an aspectual viewpoint with recourse to aspectual viewpoint auxiliaries; that is, these define an interval of reference which marks off a visible zone of the eventualities (or a subpart of them) constructed beforehand. Of this type are periphrastic constructions such as venir de P (roughly 'having just P'), être sur le point de (roughly 'be about to'), or être en train de (roughly equivalent to progressive forms in English). With these distinctions and tools, a whole array of converging syntactic and semantic regularities can be explained; in particular: (a) that aux-AV can scope over V-MAP but not the reverse; (b) that only V-MAPs are recursive; (c) that only V-MAPs can be focused and thus occur naturally at the end of an utterance; and (d) that sub-eventualities (constructed by V-MAPs) can be specified with adverbs of manner. We elaborate on these regularities below.
Phasal aspect
37 Or 'coverb'-a term used by Roy (1976 ), Wilmet (1997 ), and Kronning (2003 . 38 To which certain prefixes can be added, like en considered inchoative with s'endormir or s'envoler (Martin 1971: 53) , as well as 'aspectual support verbs' (see Borillo 2006), which also allow for the selection of an eventuality's phase (e.g. être en larmes ! fondre en larmes, 'be in tears ! burst into tears'; faire une recherche ! entamer/poursuivre une recherche 'do research ! begin/continue research'). On the other hand, the presence (under certain conditions) of a temporal adverbial normally incompatible with the intrinsic structure of the eventuality may bring about conflict resolution consisting of keeping one of the latter's phases (the one compatible with the adverbial; see Gosselin 1996: 56-63). Thus the presence of a duration adverbial scoping over an inherently punctual eventuality can lead to a shift towards the preparatory phase (e.g. il s'arrêta en dix secondes 'he stopped in ten seconds') or towards the eventuality's resultant phase (e.g. il s'arrêta pendant dix secondes 'he stopped for ten seconds'; see Borillo 1986: 138-9) .
39 See Gosselin (1996 Gosselin ( , 2005 . This type of distinction presents affinities not only with the Guillaumian aspectual tradition (Guillaume 1929) and with the cognitive perspective (Langacker 1987 (Langacker , 1991 Col and Victorri 2007) exists at least one subclass of V-MAP capable of scoping over it, while an aux-AV, to the contrary, can never be under the scope of another aux-AV. This is because we can conceptually divide a sub-eventuality within another sub-eventuality, while we cannot conceive of what a 'viewpoint holding scope over another viewpoint' could look like. (24)- (25) (26)- (27).
(26) V-MAPs focused: Il commence 'He' 'is starting' continue 'is continuing' finit 'is finishing' cesse 'is stopping' hésite 'is hesitating' s'y met 'is getting to it' s'y acharne 'is working hard to' s'y apprête 'is getting ready to' s'y précipite 'is hurrying to' en revient 'is (just) getting back' (27) aux-AVs, unavailable for focus: ? * Il (en) est sur le point 'is about to' (en) est en train [progressive/dynamic aspect marking ('being in the course of')] (en) est en passe 'is about to' #Il y va 'is going' en vient. We thus confirm the existence of two distinct classes of aspectual periphrases that allow the selection of an eventuality's phases via different routes: (i) categorization and construction of a sub-eventuality versus (ii) an aspectual viewpoint. Here is a (non-exhaustive) list of French verbal periphrases according to this classification: aux-AVs: aller, être sur le point / en passe / en voie / en train de, (en) être à, se prendre à, venir de 46 V-MAPs: être prêt à, s'apprêter à, se préparer à, se disposer à, se proposer de, hésiter à, tarder à, partir, s'installer à, aller, s'arrêter à, s'acharner à, s'efforcer de, se dépêcher de, mettre du temps à, être long à, commencer à, se mettre à, continuer à/de, être occupé à, persévérer à, cesser de, (s')arrêter de, finir de, (re)venir de, rentrer de, (re)descendre de, sortir de, etc.
The recursiveness of V-MAPs, which follows from the possibility of constructingvia categorization-a sub-eventuality from another sub-eventuality, also testifies to the fact that the phasal structure (illustrated in Figure 5 .17) holds equally for eventualities and for parts of eventualities, as well as for parts of parts, as long as they are categorized as sub-eventualities.
Classification and representation of aspectual periphrases
We can also classify, from a semantic perspective, the aux-AVs and V-MAPs by the type of phase they allow the selection of (according to aspectual viewpoint or categorization of sub-eventualities, respectively) as is summarized in Tables 5.1 and 5.2. 45 These last examples would, of course, be acceptable if aller and venir were used as motion verbs. 46 This is but one of the usages of aller and venir. This classification calls for several remarks:
(a) The distinction between verbs indicating phase, mode of action, and motion is not of aspectual nature: the first indicates only the concerned phase, the others also concern the way they happen. (b) A given element can represent various usages in context which relate to different subclasses. This is true, for example, of the verbs aller 'go' and venir 'come', which have given rise to an abundant literature (for the periphrastic future, see especially Vet 1993 and 2001). It appears that these two verbs can function, among other things, as: 1996: 27) .
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When there is a succession of two occurrences of aller in preverbal position (tu vas aller faire les courses), the former works as a temporal auxiliary or an aspectual viewpoint auxiliary (depending on context), while the latter can only be interpreted as a motion verb (e.g. Je vais aller me promener).
(c) The V-MAPs may mark:
-the co-occurrence of a sub-eventuality with an eventuality-phase (e.g. commencer à, continuer à, finir de);
-the inclusion of a sub-eventuality inside a phase (e.g. s'apprêter à, hésiter à . . . ); for instance, rentrer de in the utterance rentrer de faire les courses marks the inclusion of the sub-eventuality in the resultant phase and not its co-occurrence with it, so that a prospective viewpoint on this sub-eventuality does not necessarily entail that the preceding phase still takes place. As a result, we notice that from (30), one cannot infer (31):
(30) Paul était sur le point de rentrer de faire ses courses.
'Paul was about to come back from grocery shopping.'
(31) Paul était encore en train de (finir de) faire ses courses. 'Paul was still (finishing his) grocery shopping.'
In effect, it may be the case with (30) that Paul is already in the resultant phase (i.e. that he has finished grocery shopping, but has not begun going back home);
-an overlap, possibly partial, of several phases (i.e. se hâter de, s'acharner à, s'efforcer de . . . ).
(d) The verbs indicating a mode of action which are about the internal aspect (e.g. s'acharner à, se hâter de, se dépêcher de, être long à . . . ) are used to express the preparatory phase of the eventuality if the latter is punctual (i.e. if the internal phases are not accessible). We show in Gosselin (1996: 172-6 ) that this mode of conflict resolution-by shifting to the preparatory phase-is regular and predictable. This explains, among other things, why se dépêcher de becomes equivalent to ne pas perdre de temps avant de and why être long à is a quasi-synonym of tarder à when the eventuality is punctual, as in (32)- (33). The sub-eventuality marked by commencer à coincides with the initial phase of the eventuality manger, while that expressed by hésiter à is included in the OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF -REVISES, 17/4/2013, SPi preparatory phase of the sub-eventuality which also corresponds to the preparatory phase of manger. This structure thus illustrates both the fact that hésiter à commencer à manger is quasi-synonymous with hésiter à manger, and that avoir hésité à commencer à manger 'having hesitated to start eating' does not imply commencer à manger 'start to eat' in so far as B''2 does not necessarily coincide with B'1 (i.e. the resultant phase of the sub-eventuality hésiter can begin before the beginning of the sub-eventuality commencer, which coincides in turn with the beginning of the eventuality manger).
The aux-AVs, in relation to inflection, serve to indicate the position of the reference/monstration interval relatively to that of the eventuality, thus defining a type of aspectual viewpoint. With the utterance in (34) we associate the aspectual structure in Figure 5 .21:
(34) Il était en train de rentrer chez lui 'He was going (was in the course of going) back home.'
Sub-eventualities (indicated by V-MAPs) can be combined with aspectual viewpoints (indicated by the aux-AVs and/or verbal inflection). The aspectual viewpoint corresponds to the position occupied by the reference interval ([I,II] ) that is positioned both in relation to the most embedded sub-eventuality (i.e. the one corresponding to the most fine-grained stage of decomposition of the (sub-) eventualities), which we call the direct aspectual viewpoint, and in relation to the other eventualities and sub-eventualities within the structure, which we call indirect aspectual viewpoint. Thus, in the utterance in (35), the direct viewpoint, marked by the French imparfait, is imperfective on the preparatory phase instantiated by se disposer à (B'1 < I < II < B'2), but is prospective on the eventuality (II < B1).
(35) Au moment où il se disposait à frapper deux coups discrets à la petite porte, elle s'ouvrit . . . (Ponson du Terrail, Une fille d'Espagne, R. Laffont, 1992: 2) 'At the instant he was readying himself to discreetly knock twice at the small door, it opened.' Figure 5 .22 accounts for this:
Likewise, in example (36), the perfect viewpoint, expressed in this context by the past perfect (plus-que-parfait), targets the sub-eventuality se mettre à 'begin', which picks up the initial phase of the eventuality descendre 'descend'; thus the direct aspectual viewpoint is a perfect viewpoint. But the indirect viewpoint is imperfective (hence the repetition of descendre in 'il descendait' with the imperfective imparfait), as illustrated in Figure 5 .23.
Modal interpretation of phasal aspect
The hypothesis according to which the final bound of the reference interval creates-on the semantic level-a modal breakpoint between the aspectual modal values of OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF -REVISES, 17/4/2013, SPi the irrevocable and the possible, also applies to indirect aspectual viewpoints (with a V-MAP). If the indirect viewpoint on the eventuality is prospective, then the eventuality is entirely situated within the realm of the possible, whatever the direct viewpoints of the sub-eventualities (marked by the V-MAP). As a consequence, the right-hand context may invalidate the eventuality's achievement (see example (35) above).
When the indirect viewpoint is imperfective (on the eventuality), the initial bound belongs to the irrevocable, and the final bound to the possible, which implies that telic eventualities are (at least provisionally) indeterminate as regards their actual completion. This indirect imperfective viewpoint may result from diverse configurations, such as:
-a direct viewpoint, imperfective or perfective, on a sub-eventuality corresponding to the median phase, e.g. il continuait/continua de faire la vaisselle 'he continue-IMP/SP to wash the dishes';
-an imperfective or perfect viewpoint on the initial phase, e.g. il commençait/ avait commencé à faire la vaisselle 'he begin-IMP/PP . . . '; -a prospective or imperfective viewpoint on the final phase, e.g. il allait finir/ finissait de faire la vaisselle 'he was about to finish/finish-IMP'.
Take, for instance, the following example of an imperfective viewpoint on the initial phase, with an interruption of the eventuality:
(37) La marquise se replaça auprès du feu, et vers minuit le sommeil commençait à la gagner, lorsque la porte s'ouvrit tout à coup . . . (Ponson du Terrail, Une fille d'Espagne) The marquise sat near the fire, and around midnight sleep begin-IMP to overcome her, when the door suddenly opened.
It is noteworthy that with verbs of initial phase, this configuration, comparable to the 'imperfective paradox', occurs even when the initial phase is viewed from a perfective perspective, since the final bound of the eventuality is not accessible (which shows, by the way, that the imperfective paradox is not directly tied to progressive aspect, contrary to what is usually considered), as example (38) and Figure 5 .24 demonstrate.
(38) Arrivé chez lui, Paul se mit à faire la vaisselle, mais il ne la termina pas. (Vetters 2003: 123) 'Once he had arrived home, Paul began to wash the dishes, but didn't finish.'
When the indirect aspectual viewpoint is 'terminative' (i.e. perfective on the final phase) or perfect, the eventuality is entirely situated within the irrevocable; thus its occurrence and completion cannot be cancelled, e.g. il acheva de faire les courses/il rentra de faire les courses 'he achieve-SP/come-SP back from shopping for groceries'. On the other hand, if the direct viewpoint on the sub-eventuality is imperfective on the final phase, again an 'imperfective paradox' situation arises, since the indirect viewpoint on the eventuality is then imperfective, as in example (39) The journalist chose a past reference point (situated by hier matin) to show, through the use of various aspectual viewpoints, what was happening at that moment, as if the scene were occurring before the reader's eyes. All the elements preceding the final bound of that reference point have irrevocably occurred, while those which follow are merely possible. Thus arriver à Addis-Abeba is presented as perfect (by the aspectual auxiliary venir de), thus as having occurred. Then participer au sommet de l'OUA is viewed prospectively (because of the verb s'apprêter à), and thus as possible. On the contrary, traverser les rues de la capitale . . . is presented by means of an imperfective viewpoint (marked by the imparfait), which situates only the beginning of the eventuality within the irrevocable, its end (the actual arrival at the conference centre) remaining only possible. The subsequent passage, in (41), indicates precisely that these possibilities did not occur: (2007: 630) claim, the aspectual viewpoint plays a decisive role at the truth-conditional level, despite the fact that it has no referential status. More precisely, if an eventuality occurred at a certain phase, the preceding phases in the phasal structure necessarily occurred too, whereas those that follow remain open. As a result, the assertion of an eventuality phase entails the presupposition(s) of the preceding phases. 49 Since in assertive utterances the reference interval is equivalent to the assertion interval (Klein's 1994 'Topic Time'), the phases on the left-hand side of this interval are presupposed. Thus from (42) we legitimately infer (43), but not (44) In this perspective, presuppositions such as Jean used to smoke, conveyed by utterances like Jean a cessé de fumer 'Jean quit smoking', are not due to the specific properties of the verb cesser 'quit' but to general inferences based on the selection of an eventuality's terminal phase. The same presupposition would occur with other 49 For more on the notion of temporal presupposition, see Molendijk (1993) ; Molendijk and Vet (1995). verbs specifically indicating the terminal phase, such as, in French, arrêter de 'stop', or, with telic eventualities, finir de/achever de/terminer de 'finish', 'achieve'.
This applies to factive constructions as well. A factive presupposition associated with a phase entails the presupposition of the preceding phases, but not of the following ones. Utterance (45) entails (42) and (43), but not (44).
(45) Luc ignore que Pierre a continué de manger son gâteau.
'Luc doesn't know that Pierre continued to eat his cake.'
Conclusion
We have attempted to show that the relations between temporality and modality in French should not be thought of in the perspective of a clear-cut dichotomy. On the contrary, temporality and modality are two essential, interrelated, dimensions of the utterance. We suggested that their connection is achieved at the semantic level by the aspectual viewpoint. Indeed, it is the aspectual viewpoint, expressed mainly by verbal inflection and aspectual periphrases, which determines the position of the modal breakpoint that opposes the possible to the irrevocable. The aspectual viewpoint, defined by the position of the reference interval relative to that of the eventuality, constitutes the essential element of the representational semantic-cognitive apparatus which simulates the presentness of a past moment (see also de Saussure, this volume, for other aspects of temporal simulation with modal effects), to which is attributed the basic modal property of the present of hosting the modal breakpoint. In narrative discourse, it is this temporal-modal organization that enables a reader to have mental states oriented towards the future (expectations, fear, hope, and so forth), and at the same time tied to past events.
Aspectual viewpoint is no less important for truth-conditional semantics and inferences; only by taking it into account is it possible to predict legitimate inferences about the completion of eventualities expressed in utterances.
